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Abstract: 
Combining the methods of neuroscience and economics generates powerful tools for 
studying the brain processes behind human social interaction. We argue that hedonic 
interpretations of theories of social preferences provide a useful framework that 
generates interesting predictions and helps interpret brain activations involved in 
altruistic, fair and trusting behaviors. These behaviours are consistently associated with 
activation in reward-related brain areas such as the striatum and with prefrontal 
activity implicated in cognitive control, the processing of emotions, and integration of 
benefits and costs, consistent with resolution of a conflict between self-interest and 
other-regarding motives.  
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As in behaviorist psychology, the long-standing tradition in economic theory has been to 
treat preferences and beliefs as impossible or difficult to observe directly; instead, their effects 
were thought to be only revealed by direct choices. The emerging neuroeconomic approach 
[1-4] rejects the premise of unobservability, and seeks a microfoundation of social and 
economic activity in neural circuitry, using fMRI, TMS, pharmacological interventions, and 
other techniques. The neuroeconomic approach hopes to unify mechanistic, mathematical and 
behavioral (choice-based) measures and constructs. Byproducts of such an ambitious program 
might include better understanding of individual differences and development over the human 
lifecycle (including disorders and expertise), insights into the effects of direct and social 
learning, empirical discipline of evolutionary modeling, and advice for how economic rules 
and institutions can be designed so that people react to rules in a socially-efficient way.  
In this review we discuss the neural circuitry involved in altruistic, fair and trusting 
behaviors. Traditional economic analyses generally makes the simplifying assumption that 
people are exclusively self-regarding, but there is now a large body of experimental evidence 
[5, 6] indicating that many people exhibit social preferences, i.e, their preferred choices are 
based on a positive or negative concern for the welfare of others, and on what other players 
believe about them. Social neuroeconomics tries to understand the brain processes that govern 
these regular deviations from purely self-interested behavior. Social neuroeconomics 
combines the tools of social cognitive neuroscience [7-9] with well-structured tasks taken 
from economic theory (Box 1 and Table 1). These tasks come equipped with benchmark 
theoretical predictions about rational play and social efficiency of outcomes, which are useful 
for interpreting the results and cumulating regularity across studies.  
Roughly speaking, there are two viewpoints in economic and biological sciences about 
why pro-social behaviors occur. One view is that behavior in one-shot anonymous games 
indicates a reflexive behavior that is highly adapted for repeated interactions in which 
immediate pro-social behavior earns future benefits. In this view, pro-sociality in one-shot 
games results from bounds on rationality in fully responding to changes in economic structure 
forthcoming in: Trends in Cognitive Sciences
 3
[7]. The other view is that pro-social behavior reflects robust social preferences for treating 
others generously or reciprocally, and those preferences are similar to preferences for other 
kinds of primary and secondary rewards (the “reward interpretation”, see Table 1).  
This paper focuses on recent studies that provide some tentative evidence of neural 
activity which might eventually distinguish these two broad viewpoints. Some of the 
questions asked in social neuroeconomics include: What are the neural networks and the 
motivational forces behind charitable donations, rejections in ultimatum bargaining games, 
punishment of greedy behavior in third party punishment games or decisions to trust and to 
reciprocate trust altruistically? To what extent do emotional and rewarding factors play a role 
here, and how do they interact with the human ability for rational deliberation?  
 
Theories of social preferences and the brain 
Economic theories of social preferences [10-17] model the motivational forces driving the 
deviations from economic self-interest in a precise way. In theories of reciprocal fairness [11, 
16, 17], for example, players are assumed to positively value kind intentions, and to 
negatively value hostile intentions, of other players. Thus, if player A reduces B’s payoff to 
his own benefit, a reciprocal player B will punish A, whereas if bad luck led to a 
redistribution of income from B to A, a reciprocal player B will not punish [18]. In contrast, if 
a player is motivated by inequity aversion [13], i.e. a dislike of unequal outcomes per se, then 
bad luck will induce player B to take action to redistribute income [19]. Likewise, some 
theories postulate an individual’s desire to increase the economic welfare of the group they 
belong to [14, 15], to experience a warm glow from altruistic giving to worthy causes [10], or 
to maintain a positive social image [20]. 
Theories of social preferences are based on the concept of decision utility [21]. A 
decision utility is a numerical measure which is thought to underly observed behaviour (e.g., 
the action chosen from a set of choices is inferred to have the highest numerical decision 
utility). Decision utility can, in principle, be distinguished from (a) experienced utility, which 
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is the hedonic experience associated with the consumption of a good or an event, and from (b) 
anticipated utility, which is the anticipation of experienced utility at the time of decision-
making. One of the central questions in social neuroeconomics, which recent studies address, 
is how the brain constructs decision utilities when a person’s behaviour reflects their own 
rewards but is also governed by competing motives such as warm glow altruism, reciprocity 
or inequity aversion. This general question implies a host of other important questions such 
as: Is self-interest a primary motive that needs to be constrained by appropriate inhibitory 
machinery? If so, which brain circuitry is involved in these inhibitory processes? To what 
extent are these processes related to emotion regulation? Are deviations from economic self-
interest partly governed by positive hedonic consequences associated with non-selfish 
behaviours and, if so, are these complex social rewards represented in the striatum and the 
OFC like primary or monetary rewards [22, 23] or do they rely on different neural circuitries?  
 
Social preferences and reward circuitry 
Theories of reciprocity and inequity aversion imply that subjects prefer the mutual 
cooperation outcome over the unilateral defection outcome in the canonical prisoners’ 
dilemma game although unilateral defection leads to a higher economic payoff (Table 1abc). 
Although these theories do not make assumptions about the hedonic processes associated with 
fairness related behaviors (because they rely on inferred decision utilities), a plausible 
interpretation of these theories is that subjects in fact derive higher hedonic value from the 
mutual cooperation outcome [24]. Indeed, there is questionnaire evidence (M. Kosfeld, E. 
Fehr and J. Weibull, unpublished) supporting the view that mutual cooperation in social 
exchanges has special subjective value, beyond the value that is associated with monetary 
earnings (Table 1d). Therefore, a natural question is whether we can find neural traces of the 
special reward value of the mutual cooperation outcome. Two neuroimaging studies [25, 26] 
report activation in the ventral striatum, when subjects experience mutual cooperation with a 
human partner compared to mutual cooperation with a computer partner. Despite the fact, that 
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the monetary gain is identical in both situations, mutual cooperation with a human partner is 
associated with higher striatal activity, consistent with the reward hypothesis, given 
substantial evidence from other studies with primary and secondary rewards that the striatum 
is activated by anticipated reward.  
Social preference theories also predict that subjects prefer to punish unfair behavior such 
as defection in public good and PD games (Table 1e) because leaving an unfair act 
unpunished is associated with higher disutility than bearing the cost of punishing an unfair 
act. In this view, it is natural to hypothesize that the act of punishing defection involves higher 
activation of reward circuitry. A study using PET [27] examined this hypothesis in the context 
of a PD game with a punishment opportunity similar to the one described in Table 1e. This 
study showed that the dorsal striatum (caudate nucleus) is strongly activated in the contrast 
between a real punishment condition (in which the assignment of punishment points hurt the 
defector in economic terms) and a symbolic punishment condition (in which the assignment 
of punishment points did not reduce the defector’s economic payoff). In another study [28] 
subjects first played a sequential PD with (confederate) fair and unfair opponents. The focal 
subjects were then scanned (using fMRI) when a slight pain – an electrical shock – was 
administered either to themselves or to confederate partners who behaved fairly or unfairly. 
Both men and women exhibited empathic responses in anterior cingulate and anterior insula 
when the fair partner received pain. However, only men report a higher desire for revenge 
against unfair partners, and also exhibit activation in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) when unfair partners are shocked. Male revenge-desire ratings 
across subjects are also correlated with the estimate of NAcc activity, consistent with the view 
that there is reward value in observing the punishment of unfair partners.  
Further evidence that decisions involving social preferences are associated with activity 
in reward circuitry comes from fMRI studies of charitable donations [29, 30] and reaction to 
offers in a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum bargaining game [31]. Ventral tegmental (VTA) and 
striatal areas are both activated by receiving money and non-costly donations, indicating that 
‘giving has its own reward’ [29] Across subjects, those who made more costly donations also 
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had more activity in the striatum. Decisions to donate, whether costly or not, activate the 
subgenual area, which is densely connected with mesolimbic dopaminergic and serotonergic 
pathways and is implicated in social attachment mechanisms and in regulating the release of 
the neuromodulator oxytocin via the anterior hypothalamus. In [30] subjects are in two 
conditions – a forced donation and a voluntary donation condition. In the former, subjects 
passively observed that money is transferred to their account or to the charities account. In the 
voluntary condition the subjects could decide whether to accept such monetary transfers. Both 
in the forced and the voluntary condition subjects reported higher satisfaction if they 
themselves receive more money or if the charity receives more money (controlling for the 
subject’s cost of this transfer). Moreover, in both conditions activations in dorsal and ventral 
striatum are positively correlated with the money that goes to the charity and to the subjects 
themselves. Finally, a recent ultimatum game study [31] provides evidence suggesting that the 
fairness of a bargaining offer – controlling for the absolute size of the monetary gain – is 
associated with activations in the ventral striatum. The same dollar bargaining offer of, say 
$5, elicits higher striatal activation if the offer represents a fair share (say 50%) of the amount 
which is being bargained over, compared to when that dollar offer represents a small share 
(say, only 15%). 
The activations observed in these studies and several others indicate that social rewards 
commonly activate the dorsal or ventral striatum (see Figure 1A). There is substantial overlap 
between these areas of activation and activation observed in studies of reinforcement learning 
or anticipated money reward (Figure 1B). This overlap is consistent with the hypothesis that 
social preferences are similar to preferences for one’s own rewards in terms of neural 
activation.  
 
Do activations in reward circuitry predict choices? 
The above evidence is consistent with the view that costly pro-social acts of charitable 
donation and punishment of unfair behaviors are both rewarding. However, the hedonic 
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interpretation of social preference theories also implies that such acts occur because they are 
rewarding. Evidence for causality is also important for moving from correlation to causality, 
and because some studies suggest monetary gains and losses might both be fully processed by 
a unitary system, centered on the striatum [32, 33]. If this unitary activity holds more 
generally for positively and negatively valenced goods, the mere fact that studies show higher 
fMRI BOLD responses for costly altruistic acts may indicate a costly experience rather than a 
rewarding one. But if it could be shown that higher activations in the striatum imply a higher 
willingness to act altruistically, the case for the reward interpretation would be strengthened 
considerably (since it is implausible to observe this relation between striatum activation and 
altruistic acts if striatum activation represents the cost of the act rather than its reward value).  
Neuroimaging data do not allow causal inferences, but it is possible to move towards 
causality by predicting from neural activity in one treatment to choice behaviour in another 
treatment (“out of treatment” forecasting). For example, in [27] individual differences in 
caudate nucleus activation when punishment is costless for the punisher predicts how much 
individuals actually pay for punishment when it is not costless. Likewise, in [30] individual 
differences in striatal activity in the condition in which donations are forced predicts subjects’ 
willingness to donate money to charities in the condition in which donations are voluntary 
(Figure 2). These results further support the reward interpretation of social preferences, which 
in turns provides support for the hypothesis of a common neural currency of socially-
preferred and other primary and secondary rewards [34].  
 
The role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in decisions involving social preferences  
If people have social preferences the brain must compare social motives and economic self-
interest and resolve conflict between them. Several studies indicate that the prefrontal cortex 
plays a decisive role in such conflict resolution. For example, in the contrast between costly 
punishment condition and costless punishment of players who behaved unfairly, the 
ventromedial PFC (BA 10, 11) has been implicated [27], consistent with the hypothesis that 
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this area is involved in the integration of separate benefits and costs in the pursuit of 
behavioral goals [35]. The crucial role of VMPFC in decisions involving social preferences is 
also supported by evidence [36] that subjects with brain lesions in VMPFC reject ultimatum 
game offers more frequently, suggesting that the cost of rejecting positive offers has less 
weight in the decision process if VMPFC is impaired. Finally, in charitable donations [29] the 
contrast between altruistic decisions involving costs and no costs also activated the VMPFC 
(BA 10, 11, 32) and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Since the ACC is thought to 
play a key role in conflict monitoring [37], activity in this region is consistent with the 
existence of a trade off between self-interest and pro-social motives.  
The role of the VMPFC in decisions involving costly altruism is also interesting because 
of related activation in this region in other studies. The VMPFC is involved in emotional 
processing and moral judgment [38, 39] and in integrating the value of consumer products and 
their prices [40]. Lesions to VMPFC are also associated with poor choices  in various 
situations [41, 42] which require integrating costs and benefits. These studies and those on the 
VMPFC’s role in expression of social preference suggest a general role in integrating 
emotional feelings about costs and benefits, regardless of whether these choices involve 
economic consumption goods or “non-economic” goods such as the subjective value of acting 
altruistically.  
Two neuroimaging studies [31, 43] suggest that the dorsolateral (DLPFC) and 
ventrolateral (VLPFC) prefrontal cortex are also likely to play an important role in the 
processing of decisions involving social preferences. These studies examined the neural 
circuitry involved in the recipient’s behavior in an ultimatum game where the rejection of low 
positive offers involves a motivational conflict between fairness and economic self-interest. 
The first study [43] reports activation of bilateral DLPFC, bilateral anterior insula (AI) as well 
ACC in the contrast between “unfair>fair” offers. In addition, the higher the activation of 
right AI the more likely a subject rejects an unfair offer suggesting that AI activation may be 
related to the degree of emotional resentment of unfair offers. Due to the role of ACC in 
conflict monitoring [37], the activation of ACC in this task may reflect the motivational 
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conflict between fairness and self-interest when facing unfair offers. Finally, the DLPFC 
activation may represent the cognitive control of the emotional impulse to reject unfair offers. 
The second study [31] also finds that AI is more active during rejected trials. In addition, the 
right VLPFC is more activated (relative to a resting baseline) when unfair offers are accepted, 
which may indicate that this region down-regulates the resentment associated with unfair 
offers.  
The interpretation that DLPFC activity represents the cognitive control of the impulse to 
reject implies that interfering or disrupting DLPFC activity reduces the control of the impulse 
and should, thus, increase the rejection rate. Knoch et al. [44] examined this hypothesis by 
reducing the activation in right and left DLPFC with low-frequency transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS). Surprisingly, the study found that TMS of right DLPFC increases the 
acceptance rate of unfair offers relative to a placebo stimulation (from 9% to 44%) while 
TMS of left DLPFC did not affect behavior significantly. This finding suggests that right 
DLPFC is causally involved in controlling the impulse that pushes subjects towards accepting 
unfair offers, i.e., with controlling economic self-interest. Interestingly, the disruption of right 
DLPFC only affects subjects’ fairness related behaviors but not their fairness judgments, i.e., 
they still judge low offers as very unfair, but they nevertheless accept them more frequently 
and more quickly. 
 
Trust, reputation and social preferences 
Social preferences models predict that trusting other individuals, by making investments that 
may not be repaid, is not just a decision involving monetary risk. Reciprocal and inequity 
averse subjects derive a special disutility from betrayal of trust, along with the associated  
economic loss, which is consistent with behavioral studies [45] indicating a pure aversion to 
social betrayal. The first evidence that the brain distinguishes between social trust and 
monetary risk-taking comes from [46] who infused the synthetic neuropeptide oxytocin 
intranasally to players in a trust game. OT-infused players were more trusting than a placebo 
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control group, although OT-players’ beliefs about the chances of being repaid were not higher 
and OT did not affect risk-taking in a pure risk condition. Thus, OT seems to limit the fear of 
betrayal in social interactions, consistent with animal evidence that it inhibits defensive 
behavior and facilitates maternal behavior and pair bonding [47]. The hypothesis that the fear-
of-betrayal-reducing effect of oxytocin might be due to a reduced activation of the amygdala 
is consistent with a study [48] showing that OT dampens amygdala activity and its 
connections to the brainstem if subjects view emotionally arousing pictures. Amygdala 
involvement has been shown to occur in assessing the trustworthiness of faces [49, 50] and 
the processing of ambiguous events [51], which both have social implications.  
Since trust decisions are also likely to involve perspective taking, they should also 
activate areas implicated in theory of mind tasks such as the paracingulate cortex and the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) [52]. One of the earliest neuroeconomic studies 
[53] reports activation of the paracingulate in a trust game when subjects play against another 
person compared to a computerized opponent. Another study found that pSTS is activated 
simply by showing the faces of intentional cooperators compared to nonintentional agents 
[28].  
In repeated trust games a player learns about his opponent’s choices so that the opponent 
acquires a reputation. In game theory this reputation is defined as the subjective probability 
that the opponent is the type of player who prefers to reciprocate trust. In this approach 
players’ preferences and their subjective beliefs are distinct concepts and a rational player’s 
beliefs are not colored by his preferences or his emotions towards the opponent. It is 
interesting to examine whether the brain also makes this distinction, i.e., whether the neural 
networks involved in hedonic preferences and emotional processing are distinct from the 
networks involved in assessing the opponent’s reputation or whether there is substantial 
overlap in these neural networks.  
Preliminary evidence suggests that the latter is likely to be true. In one study [54] 
players faced a series of cooperative and noncooperative opponents in a sequential PD game. 
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The authors found that simply displaying the faces of cooperative partners (relative to neutral 
faces) in a subsequent gender assessment task activated striatal and emotion related areas such 
as the amygdala, the insula and the putamen. This suggests that a trustworthy person’s face 
automatically trigger emotions and reward expectations, as if simply seeing another person’s 
face activates its representation as a future exchange value. 
The importance of the striatum in learning the opponent’s trustworthiness has been 
demonstrated by two other studies. In [55] the activity in caudate nucleus signals whether the 
other player reciprocates an earlier move. A further study using the same trust-game paradigm 
showed specializations in the cingulate for encoding decisions of others and oneself [56]. In 
[57] trustors repeatedly face three partners whose (fictional) profiles make them seem morally 
good, bad or neutral (instilling a prior belief about trustworthiness). By design, all three 
fictional partners repay in the trust game with the same frequency. During the outcome phase 
the caudate nucleus activates more strongly for repayment outcomes from the neutral partner, 
but not from the other partners, presumably because the neutral partner represents 
unpredictable outcomes and there is more to learn.  
 
Conclusions and Research Directions 
In this review we showed how theories of social preferences guided the conduct of 
neuroeconomic experiments and the interpretation of the resulting brain data. One emerging 
theme of the studies reviewed above is that social reward activates circuitry that overlaps, to a 
surprising degree, to circuitry which anticipates and represents other types of rewards. These 
studies reinforce the idea that social preferences for donating money, rejecting unfair offers, 
trusting others, and punishing those who violate norms, are genuine expressions of preference. 
The social rewards are traded off with subjects’ economic self-interest and the dorsolateral 
and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are likely to be crucially involved in the balancing of 
competing rewards. These processes can also be altered by treatments like oxytocin infusion 
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and TMS disruption, actually changing behavior in ways that are consistent with hypotheses 
derived from fMRI.  
Economics and other social sciences may benefit from social neuroeconomics because 
of the potentially unifying force of neural data for choice based approaches. Most of 
economics assumes for example, that beliefs about other people’s behavior are based on a 
rational assessment of the available information; they are neither directly affected by 
preferences nor are they disturbed by emotions. The results in [54] suggest however, that 
beliefs about other people’s trustworthiness may be strongly affected by reward and emotion 
circuitry. This study also creates a paradigm for exploring how rapidly reputations increase 
and decrease, and whether good reputations built up by particular players in racial, gender or 
class-based social groups might generalize to new players in those same groups. This kind of 
group-based neural generalization of expected reward could be important in understanding the 
powerful role of social networks and physical cues in labor market discrimination, for 
example. 
Another example illustrating the potential of neuroeconomics comes from recalling the 
economist’s concepts of risk preferences, time preferences (the willingness to postpone 
consumption) and social preferences. Most economic analyses treat these as separate types of 
preference. However, suppose all three types of preference share some common neural 
circuitry for controlling automatic emotional impulses (based on fear, temptation, and 
selfishness, respectively), by integrating all the costs and benefits of choices. If there is such a 
shared basis of preference, it is important for economists and other social scientists to 
understand, and this can be best established by data from imaging, lesion patient studies, and 
other neuroscientific measures. For example, two studies by Knoch et al. [44, 58] show that 
disruption of right, but not left, DLPFC with TMS increases both risk-taking in choice tasks 
and self-interested choices in ultimatum games. A natural next step is to investigate whether 
disruption of right DLPFC also makes people more impatient.  
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Future studies should exploit the wide range of tools available to neuroscientists, using 
multiple measures at the same time (e.g., hormone measurement or TMS and fMRI), 
combined with the parametric value and predictions about more complex games. Focusing on 
neural bases also opens up research directions which are, perhaps surprisingly, unexplored in 
economics. For example, the standard analysis in game theory assumes that players are “in 
equilibrium” (i.e., they correctly anticipate, from introspection or learning, what others are 
planning to do). In equilibrium analysis there is no room for differences in strategic skill. Yet 
one study [59] found that skill varied systematically across players (as measured by belief 
accuracy and differences in earnings). When making choices, more skilled players showed 
more activity in the ventral striatum and precuneus (as if they anticipated higher money 
rewards) and less skilled players showed more activity in the insula (as if they were feeling 
discomfort from strategic uncertainty).  
These directions might eventually provide a biological basis for a mathematical 
characterization of social exchange that is rooted in neural details but can also make 
predictions about activity in strategic interaction and market trading, and about how behavior 
can change when causally manipulated by pharmacology, TMS, and other tools.  
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Box 1: Measuring social preferences with games 
Experimental games enable measurement of how much of their own economic payoff 
players are willing to sacrifice to increase or decrease the payoffs of others [5, 6]. These 
games are typically played one-shot, with anonymous partners and with real monetary stakes. 
They provide a solid collection of empirical regularities from which the study of neural 
activity can proceed. 
In a “dictator” game [60, 61] one player – the dictator – is given a sum of money which 
he can allocate between herself and another player – the recipient. Dictator allocations are a 
mixture of 50% offers and 0% offers (i.e., the dictator keeps everything), and a few offers in 
between 50 and 0%, but the allocations are sensitive to details of how the game is described 
[6], the dictator’s knowledge of who the recipient is [62] and whether the recipient knows that 
she is part of a dictator game [63].  
In an ultimatum game, the recipient can reject the proposed allocation [64]. If she rejects 
it both players receive nothing. Rejections are evidence of negative reciprocity [11], the 
motive to punish players who have treated you unfairly, or inequity aversion[13], a distaste 
for unfair outcomes. The strength of these motives can be measured by how much a recipient 
loses by rejecting a proposed allocation. Offers of less than 20% are rejected about half the 
time; Proposers seem to anticipate these rejections and consequently offer around 40% on 
average. Cross-cultural studies, however, show that across small-scale societies ultimatum 
offers are more generous when cooperative activity and market trade are more common [65]. 
In a third party punishment game two players, the dictator A and the recipient B, 
participate in a dictator game [66]. A third player, the potential punisher C, observes how 
much A gives to B; then C can spend a proportion of his endowment on punishing A. This 
game measures to what extent “impartial” and “unaffected” third parties are willing to stick 
up for other players at their own expense, enforcing a sharing norm by punishing greedy 
dictators. Between 50 and 60% of the third parties punish selfish deviations from the equal 
split suggesting that giving less than 50% in the dictator game violates a fairness norm. In 
principle, the third party punishment option can be used to measure economic willingness to 
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punish violation of any social norm (e.g., a violation of etiquette, breaking a taboo, or making 
a linguistic slur).  
In a trust game [67, 68], two players, A and B each have an initial endowment. First, A 
decides whether to keep his endowment or to send it to B. Then B observes A’s action and 
decides whether to keep the amount she received or share some if it with A. The experimenter 
doubles or triples A’s transfer, so that both players are better off collectively if A transfers 
money and B sends back a sufficient amount. This situation mimics a sequential economic 
exchange in the absence of contract enforcement institutions. B has a strong incentive to keep 
all the money and repay none to A; if A anticipates this behavior, however, there is little 
reason to transfer so a chance for mutual gain is lost. Empirically, A’s invest about half of 
their endowment and B’s repay about as much as player A invested [6]. Player A’s invest less 
than they do in risky choices with chance outcomes however, which indicates a pure aversion 
to social betrayal and inequality [45].  
In a public goods game [5, 6, 69], which represents a generalization of the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game (see Table 1), players have a token endowment they can simultaneously invest 
in any proportion to a private project or a public project. Investment into the public project 
maximizes the aggregate earnings of the group but each individual can gain more from 
investing into the private rather than the public project. Typically, players begin by investing 
half their tokens on average (many invest either all or none). When the game is repeated over 
time, with feedback at the end of each decision period, investments decline until only a small 
fraction (about 10%) of the players invest anything. When players are allowed to also punish 
other players at a cost to themselves, many players who invested punish the players who did 
not invest, which encourages investment and leads players close to the efficient solution in 
which everyone invests [70].  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 1a. Representation of prisoners’ dilemma in terms of material payoffs 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 4, 4 0, 5 
Defect (D) 5, 0 1, 1 
 
Table 1b. Utility representation of prisoners’ dilemma if players are inequity averse 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 4, 4 0 – 5α,  5 - 5β 
Defect (D) 5 - 5β,  0 – 5α 1, 1 
 
Table 1c. Utility representation of prisoners’ dilemma if players are inequity averse with 
parameters α = 1 and β = 0.5 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 4, 4 –5, 2.5 
Defect (D) 2.5, –5 1, 1 
 
Table 1d. Player A’s actual average ranking of outcomes in the prisoners’ dilemma 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 3.2 1.6 
Defect (D) 2.7 2.5 
 
Table 1e. Utility representation if an inequity averse player A (α = 1, β = 0.5) punishes a 
selfish player B for defection 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 4, 4 –2, 0 
Defect (D) 2.5, 0 1, 1 
 
Subjective payoffs after 
player A punished a 
selfish player B for 
defection 
Table 1. In the prisoners’ dilemma (PD) each of 2 players makes one of 2 choices: cooperate 
or defect. The PD can either be played sequentially, where one player moves before the other, 
or simultaneously, where both players choose without knowing what the other one does. a. 
The PD can be thought of as a paradigm for any kind of exchange that is not enforced by third 
parties. Assume for instance that both player A and B possess a good that they value with 1; 
however they both value the other player’s good with 4 so that exchanging the goods is 
beneficial for both. In this case cooperation means to send the good to the other player while 
defection means keeping one’s good. In case of mutual cooperation (exchange) both players 
receive an economic payoff of 4, in case of mutual defection both receive 1. If player A (the 
row player) defects and player B (the column player) cooperates, A receives an economic 
payoff of 5 (the value of the own good plus the value of the other’s good) while B receives 0. 
See lower left corner of Table 1a; the first (red) number in each cell is A’s payoff, the second 
(blue) number is B’s payoff. Regardless of what B does, it is always in the self-interest of A 
to defect. The same holds for B. Thus, the unique equilibrium outcome in the game is (defect, 
defect). However, if both players defect they are worse off than if both cooperate, hence the 
dilemma. b. If both players have a strong enough preference for reciprocity [11]or if they are 
inequity averse [13] their subjective preferences transform the game. In case of inequity 
aversion a player suffers from receiving less than the other with parameter αi (envy), and also 
from receiving more than the other with parameter βi (compassion). An inequity averse player 
i’s subjective payoff Ui is a function of her own economic payoff xi and of the payoff 
differences (xj - xi) between the two players: Ui(x) = xi  - αi(xj - xi) if player i is worse off than 
player j (xj - xi ≥ 0), and Ui(x) = xi - βi(xi - xj) if player i is better off than player j (xi - xj ≥ 0). 
Inequity aversion makes unilateral defection less attractive by reducing the subjective payoff 
from 5 to (5 - 5β) while being the victim of the other player’s unilateral defection is 
particularly painful because it reduces the subjective payoff from 0 to – 5α. c. Representation 
of subjective payoffs for the special case of α = 1 and β = 0.5. Here we can see that an 
inequity averse player A values the mutual cooperation outcome with 4 whereas the unilateral 
defection outcome is only valued with 2.5. Thus, if a player believes that the other player 
cooperates the player subjectively prefers to also cooperate, rending mutual cooperation an 
equilibrium. However, mutual defection also remains an equilibrium: if an inequity averse 
player believes that the other player defects he or she prefers to defect, too. d. Subjects’ 
ordinal ranking of the four outcomes in a PD game similar to the one in Table 1a (M. Kosfeld, 
E. Fehr and J. Weibull, unpublished). Subjects had to assign a number between 1 and 4 to 
each cell of a prisoners’ dilemma. 4 represented the most highly valued outcome and 1 the 
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least valued outcome. The numbers in the table represent the outcome from the perspective of 
player A only. On average, subjects valued the mutual cooperation outcome highest (3.2) 
while the other player’s unilateral defection receives the lowest average valuation (1.6). The 
hypothesized ordinal ranking of outcomes by an inequity averse player A in Table 1c is 
identical to the actual ordinal ranking of outcomes in Table 1d. In particular, the average 
player A (Table 1d) prefers cooperation if she believes the opponent cooperates, and prefers 
defection if she believes the opponent defects. e. Suppose now that the prisoners’ dilemma is 
played sequentially – A first chooses, then B chooses, knowing what A did. Then, A observes 
whether B cooperated and defected. After this A has the chance to punish B at a cost to 
himself. An inequity averse player A will never punish B in case of mutual cooperation or 
mutual defection because the players’ payoffs are equal in these cases. However, he may be 
willing to punish if B defected unilaterally. Suppose, for example, that A can spend 1 money 
unit on punishment such that B’s income is reduced by 5 money units, causing a material 
payoff distribution of (– 1, 0) and a utility of UA = -1 - α(1 – 0) = -1 - α. If A does not punish 
B the material payoff distribution is (0, 5) and A’s utility is UA = 0 - α(5 – 0) = 0 - 5α. In 
Table 1e we assumed α = 1, implying that A’s subjective payoff is –5 if he does not punish 
while if he punishes it is –2. But for any α ≥ ¼ player A is subjectively better of if he 
punishes B. Note also that in this case only mutual cooperation is part of an equilibrium 
because a rational player B anticipates that A punishes and hence, it is not in the self-interest 
of B to defect.  
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(B) 
Figure 1. Parallelism of rewards for oneself and for others: Brain areas commonly activated in 
(A) nine studies of social reward and (B) a sample of six studies of learning and anticipated 
monetary reward. (All are projected onto Tailarach coordinate y=15; voxels of peak activation 
in original studies range from y=4 to y=24).  
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Figure 2. Predicting the frequency of subjects’ altruistic choices with brain activations “out of 
treatment”. a. In [27] subjects punished maximally when punishment of defection was 
costless but they still exhibit different activations in the dorsal striatum (y-axis). These 
activations predict how much subjects spend on punishment when it is costly (x-axis). b. In 
[30], the individual differences in striatal activations between the condition where subjects 
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just observe the charity receiving money (i.e., they cannot decide) and the condition where 
they themselves receive money can be interpreted as a measure of hedonic altruism (x-axis). 
Consistent with this interpretation, subjects with a higher difference in these activations 
accept transfers to charities more often when they have the freedom to do so (y-axis).  
 6
 
Open questions:  
1. How does the brain relate decision utility to anticipated and experienced utility? 
2. What is the relationship between moral emotions such as guilt and shame and moral 
behaviour? How can we measure and induce these moral emotions, and which 
behaviors are caused be them? 
3. Which behaviors, emotions and neural mechanisms of human prosociality are unique, 
and which do we share with other primates? 
4. What gene clusters are reliably linked to economic aspects of social behaviour?  
5. Which computational models of brain activity predict both neural events and social 
behaviour correctly? 
6. How are social disorders like autism, Asperger and Williams syndrome, social 
phobias, and anti-social personality disorder linked to differences in neural activation? 
7. How is group membership perceived and processed neurally, and what are its 
implications?  
8. How does extensive experience (e.g. experts in negotiation, or professional poker 
players) affect neural bases of social exchange?  
9. What are the neural correlates of skill in strategic interaction? How does training and 
experience affect neural activity?  
10. Many social institutions use social network connections (e.g., personal referrals) or 
agents (e.g., in bargaining); how does neural activity in these cases differ from 
personal interaction?  
 
